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Judicial Accountability,
Michel Bastarache and the Charter’s
Fundamental Freedoms
Jamie Cameron*

I. JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Michel Bastarache had a strong sense of justice, but he also valued
principle and was committed to principled decision-making. His
Supreme Court of Canada opinions were closely analyzed, rigorously
argued and powerfully written. And, as one who was proud of the Court,
he was not hesitant to defend the institution from accusations of judicial
activism. Hence he wrote that sometimes criticism was “simply based on
a misunderstanding of the facts”, and that often it was “just an attack on
outcomes disguised as an attack on judicial activism”.1 Justice
Bastarache regarded attacks on the Court‟s activism as a cover for
disapproval of certain outcomes, and responded that judicial accountability
was the answer to concerns about the Court‟s work. As he explained,
accountability “takes the form of reasons for judgments and demonstrating
that the protection against arbitrariness is in the process of decisionmaking and the reality of judicial precedent”.2 He proposed, in other
words, that principled decision-making is a check — perhaps the best or
even the only check — on judicial activism and outcome-oriented
Charter interpretation.3
In 2008, the year of Michel Bastarache‟s retirement from the Court,
Osgoode Hall Law School‟s 12th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference

*
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I owe thanks to Stephanie
Anderson, J.D. 2011, for providing research assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1
Michel Bastarache, “Decision-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 56
U.N.B.L.J. 328, at 329.
2
Id.
3
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
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explored some of his contributions to the Charter jurisprudence.4 Though
he was known and admired, throughout his professional life, as a
champion of minority language rights, Justice Bastarache was not one to
favour some issues and to ignore others. Instead, he contributed at all
levels of Charter interpretation, and over a period of 10 years on the
Court, from September 30, 1997 to June 30, 2008, he participated actively
across the spectrum of entitlements. As his fundamental freedoms
jurisprudence demonstrates, his Supreme Court legacy is rich and complex.
Justice Bastarache wrote at least nine significant opinions on section
2 issues, six of which counted as majority opinions.5 It is a surprising
record, considering that more than once he wrote to backtrack from —
and all but overrule — earlier decisions of his own. Initially, he decided
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada in favour of expressive freedom and
proposed a new and improved approach to section 2(b) decisionmaking.6 Thomson Newspapers was followed, a few years later, by
Harper v. Canada and R. v. Bryan, both of which went in the opposite
direction.7 Not only did the section 2(b) claim fail in these cases,
Bastarache J.‟s two majority opinions effectively abandoned the
Thomson Newspapers methodology. Meanwhile, his first opinions under
section 2(d) dismissed the associational freedom claims in no uncertain
terms,8 but within a space of two years led to his groundbreaking
decision in Dunmore v. Ontario.9 Here, as under section 2(b), his earlier
and later decisions are difficult to reconcile. Even so, Bastarache J. spoke
4
See also James Hendry, “The Contribution of Justice Bastarache to Equality Law” (2009)
47 S.C.L.R. (3d) 341; and Michel Y. Hélie, “Michel Bastarache‟s Language Rights Legacy” (2009)
47 S.C.L.R. (3d) 377.
5
Under s. 2(a), see Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R.
551 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Syndicat Northcrest”] (dissenting opinion); under s. 2(b), see Thomson
Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”]; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”]; R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1
S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.); and Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.)
(dissenting in part); and under s. 2(d), see Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998]
S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Egg”] (joint majority opinion
with Iacobucci J.); Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2
S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delisle v. Canada”]; R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring, [2001]
S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Advance Cutting”]; and Dunmore v.
Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Dunmore”]. Syndicat Northcrest, Re Vancouver Sun, and Advance Cutting were dissenting
opinions.
6
Thomson Newspapers, id.
7
Harper and R. v. Bryan, supra, note 5.
8
See Canadian Egg and Delisle v. Canada, supra, note 5.
9
Supra, note 5.
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for the majority in each of these cases: when he shifted, the Court —
albeit with some dissenters — tended to follow. As a result, he had a
strong but uneven influence on the Charter‟s fundamental freedoms: a
rights-dampening impact on section 2(b) that is paired with a rightsenhancing effect on section 2(d).
This article considers how this jurisprudence stands up to Justice
Bastarache‟s concept of judicial accountability. In sections which address
his key majority opinions on expressive and associational freedom, the
discussion examines the relationship between principles and outcomes in
his decision-making.10 The analysis reveals, once his reasons for judgment
and treatment of precedent are explored, that Justice Bastarache changed
his mind and, in doing so, promoted outcomes at the expense of
principled decision-making. Yet his commitment to principle — and to
the judicial accountability he advocated — caused him to ground his
conclusions in elaborate reasoning. The difficulty is that his reasoning
was convoluted and unpersuasive. To be blunt, he was a kind of
“precedent bully”: though the term is unflattering, it describes what
Justice Bastarache had to do to keep precedent on his side when it stood
in the way of certain outcomes. The article concludes that he took
judicial accountability seriously but was unable to reconcile its
requirements with the demands of decision-making — as he perceived
them — under the Charter‟s fundamental freedoms guarantees.

II. SECTION 2(b): ONE STEP FORWARD AND TWO BACK
The judges from Quebec who voted en bloc in Thomson Newspapers
v. Canada might have been surprised to find themselves relegated to
dissent.11 From their perspective, the Court‟s judgment in Libman v.
Quebec (Attorney General)12 supported their conclusion, which would
have upheld Parliament‟s blackout on opinion polls in the final 72 hours
of a federal election campaign.13 Despite invalidating the province‟s de
facto ban on third party spending, Libman found that the regulation of
referendum spending advances one of expressive freedom‟s objectives,

10
The paper does not discuss his opinions in Syndicat Northcrest, Re Vancouver Sun, or
Advance Cutting, supra, note 5.
11
Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 5. Justice Gonthier wrote a dissenting opinion which
was signed by Lamer C.J.C. and L‟Heureux-Dubé J., the other two judges from Quebec.
12
[1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Libman”].
13
Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2 (now S.C. 2000, c. 9).

326

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

“namely the [voter‟s] ability to make informed choices”.14 In Thomson
Newspapers, Gonthier J. found that the distorting effects of potentially
inaccurate polls would undermine “the informed exercise of the right to
vote” and a fundamental purpose of expressive freedom, which is to
promote “informed participation in the electoral process”.15 He stated
that there was no suggestion, in the blackout provision, that members of
Parliament had “any interest other than to foster the integrity of the
electoral process”,16 and he held, in the circumstances, that the Charter
should not defeat “a reasonable attempt by Parliament to allay potential
distortion of voter choice”.17 The dissenting judges thought that deference
was appropriate, because “[b]eing themselves the very objects of
elections, members of Parliament were in the best position to assess the
effects of polls in electoral campaigns and their impact on individual
voters.”18
Justice Gonthier‟s discussion of Libman and the informed voter was
persuasive, but not persuasive enough. Michel Bastarache, who wrote the
majority opinion in Thomson Newspapers, had joined the Court on
September 30, 1997, just one week before Libman was decided.
Thomson was one of his first panels, and it was argued, coincidentally,
the day Libman was released.19 Not only did Bastarache J.‟s majority
opinion reverse the Ontario Court of Appeal, in doing so it chose not to
apply or expand Libman‟s informed voter rationale. In striking down
section 322.1 of the Canada Elections Act, Bastarache J. noted, more
than once, that Parliament‟s opinion poll blackout constituted a serious
interference with expressive activity “at the core of s. 2(b)”.20
Significantly, he introduced a methodology that retreated from the
contextual approach of the 1990s, emphasized section 1‟s requirement of
harm, set an unflinching evidentiary standard of justification, and
provided a serious analysis of the salutary benefits-deleterious
consequences issue. It was a tour de force for a newcomer which seemed,
by its methodology as well as by the outcome, to set section 2(b)‟s
prospects on a different, and more auspicious, plane.
14
Libman, supra, note 12, at 603-604 (citing Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988]
S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.)). Quebec‟s third party referendum spending limit of
$600 was so low that it effectively operated as a ban on participation.
15
Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 5, at 908.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
The date was October 9, 1997.
20
Thomson Newspapers, supra, note 5, at 945.
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Three features of the Bastarache opinion worked in combination to
create a strong methodology for section 2(b) adjudication. First was his
recognition of the activity‟s value, and the consequences of Parliament‟s
ban, which interfered with “the flow of information pertaining to the
most important democratic duty which most Canadians will undertake in
their lives: their choice as to who will govern them”.21 Second was his
unwillingness to justify the limit in the absence of “more specific and
conclusive” evidence that the prospect of inaccurate or misleading polls
affected a large number of voters, or that “such possible distortions” in
hypothetically flawed polls are significant to the “conduct” of an
election.22 In adopting that approach, Bastarache J. neatly distinguished a
series of Supreme Court precedents — decided under the then-prevailing
version of the contextual approach — which had minimized the
requirement of harm in section 2(b) cases. Finally, given the conclusion
that “the claims of widespread or significant harm … are not
compelling”,23 he declared his unwillingness to accept that Thomson
Newspapers “warrants a significant level of deference to the government
in fashioning means which trespass on the freedom of expression”.24 At
this moment in time, Bastarache J. was firmly of the view that “little
deference should be shown … where … the government has not
established that the harm which it is seeking to prevent is widespread or
significant”.25
Justice Bastarache‟s majority opinion in Thomson Newspapers
looked much like a breakthrough decision for section 2(b). Outside the
open justice jurisprudence, the Court consistently upheld limits on
expressive freedom during the 1990s, under a section 1 methodology
styled “the contextual approach”, which had the advantage — from the
Court‟s perspective — of predetermining the outcome against expressive
freedom.26 Against that backdrop, it is no exaggeration to suggest that,
apart from Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,27 Thomson

21

Id., at 971.
Id., at 962.
23
Id., at 957.
24
Id., at 962.
25
Id., at 963.
26
For an analysis and critique of this approach, see J. Cameron, “The Past, Present and
Future of Expressive Freedom under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
27
[1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.).
22
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Newspapers was the Court‟s most important section 2(b) decision since
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General).28
At least to some, Harper v. Canada was something of a shock, not
least because Bastarache J.‟s majority opinion bore greater resemblance
to Gonthier J.‟s dissent in Thomson Newspapers than to his own majority
opinion in that case.29 Harper returned the Court to Libman‟s third party
spending issue, in the altered context of federal legislation and federal
election campaigns. The question there was whether Parliament‟s spending
limit of $3,000 per individual was still too low, or was generous enough
under Libman to pass constitutional muster.30 For a variety of reasons,
including but not limited to the number itself, it was unclear how the
Court would respond. In the interim since Libman, the judges had upheld
limits on expressive activity in two important cases — Little Sisters31 and
R. v. Sharpe32 — though both engaged section 2(b) at the level of “low
value” expression. On questions relating to the political process, the
Court had decided in favour of expressive freedom three times in a row
— in Libman, Thomson Newspapers, and Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney
General),33 and the Alberta courts had invalidated Parliament‟s new
spending limit.34 Even so, Libman was an enigma, an anonymous and
unanimous opinion which forged a careful compromise between those
judges who thought that the limits on referendum participation were
deservedly unjustifiable, and others who favoured an egalitarian
approach which placed equality-based limits on rights of democratic
participation.35 The composition of the Court had also changed, and it
28
[1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) (invalidating Quebec‟s sign language
law). Other decisions, such as RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 17,
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), invalidating Parliament‟s ban on tobacco advertising, and R. v. Zundel,
[1992] S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.), invalidating the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-46, false news offence, are also important. What sets Thomson Newspapers apart from those is
Bastarache J.‟s methodology and approach to the harm requirement.
29
Harper, supra, note 5.
30
Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 350(1).
31
Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] S.C.J. No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R.
1120 (S.C.C.) (concluding that customs officers violated the rights of a gay bookstore, but declining
to invalidate the legislation).
32
[2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.) (upholding the Criminal Code‟s child
pornography provisions, though at the same time reading two exceptions into the legislation).
33
[2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Figueroa”].
34
Harper v. Canada, [2002] A.J. No. 1542, 223 D.L.R. (4th) 275 (Alta. C.A.).
35
In that regard it is noteworthy that the Court‟s opinion in Libman gratuitously disagreed
with the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] A.J.
No. 515, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 205 (Alta. C.A.), which had invalidated earlier federal spending limits,
but not been appealed. See Libman, supra, note 12, at 604, 619 (stating baldly, that “we cannot
accept the Alberta Court of Appeal‟s point of view”).
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was significant that the Court had earlier stayed the injunction in
Harper.36 That decision allowed limits on campaign spending which
were declared unconstitutional to be enforced during an election
campaign. In hindsight it seems the Court may have tipped its hand in
leaving the provision in place and denying a constitutional remedy for
the ongoing violation of a core constitutional right.
In these circumstances, Harper v. Canada marked a turning point for
section 2(b). Given a choice between Libman‟s invitation to regulate
third party spending, and the rights-protective Thomson Newspapers
methodology, Bastarache J. returned to Libman and upheld Parliament‟s
strict limits on third party spending in federal election campaigns. As a
result of this choice, expressive activity which was at the core of section
2(b) in Thomson Newspapers did not compel a strict standard of
justification in Harper, and Parliament‟s limit was upheld though section
1‟s requirement of harm was not met. More to the point, Bastarache J.‟s
majority opinion retreated from each of the key elements of his
methodology in Thomson Newspapers. Whereas the opinion poll case put
the expressive activity on show — and was proud to defend its Charter
status — Harper minimized the value of third party participation in
election campaigns. For instance, Justice Bastarache had little choice but
to concede that democratic participation is at the core of section 2(b), but
added that in some circumstances — which were not specified — “third
party advertising will be less deserving of constitutional protection”.37
He also refused to apply Figueroa‟s principle of meaningful participation
to campaign spending.38 In place of Thomson Newspapers and its
methodology, Bastarache J. revived Libman‟s “informed voter” and
interpreted Figueroa‟s concept of meaningful participation to produce a
conclusion that “equality in the political discourse is necessary”.39 Under
this view, voters are informed when their access to information is
controlled for equality, and participate meaningfully when information is
36
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] S.C.J. No. 58, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 764
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper I”] (Major J., dissenting).
37
Harper v. Canada, supra, note 5, at para. 85.
38
Figueroa, supra, note 33. There, and in the context of s. 3 of the Charter, Iacobucci J.
made a series of uninhibited and untethered pronouncements about the scope and importance of
participation in the electoral process. For instance, he spoke of the right “to a certain level of
participation” (at 934); stated that each citizen “must have a genuine opportunity to take part in the
governance of the country through participation in the selection of elected representatives” (at 936);
and declared that participation has “an intrinsic value independent of its impact on the actual
outcome of elections” (at 935). His colleague Michel Bastarache concurred in that opinion.
39
Harper v. Canada, supra, note 5, at para. 72.
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curbed, rather than made freely available, to ensure the egalitarian
presentation of ideas.
Moreover, while Thomson Newspapers insisted on evidence of harm,
and refused to uphold the opinion poll blackout in its absence, Harper
effectively dispensed with the requirement. In answer to evidence that
third-party advertising has had no impact on elections, Bastarache J.
retorted that the findings “do not allow us, however, to conclude that
third-party advertising will never have an impact in Canadian
elections”.40 In addition, he alarmingly declared that “[s]urely Parliament
does not have to wait for the feared harm to occur before it can enact
measures to prevent the possibility of harm occurring or to remedy the
harm, should it occur.”41 In effect, this constituted an invitation to
Parliament to pre-empt expressive activity — which is not only
guaranteed by the Charter but is found at its core — in case it might at
some hypothetical date cause previously unknown harm.
Finally, after taking care in Thomson Newspapers to dissociate
himself from the concept, Bastarache J. openly embraced deference in
Harper. Thus he criticized the lower courts for failing to “give any
deference to Parliament‟s choice of electoral model”, stated that “[g]iven
the right of Parliament to choose Canada‟s electoral model and the
nuances inherent in implementing this model, the Court must approach
the justification analysis with deference,” and concluded that “[o]n
balance, the contextual factors favour a deferential approach to Parliament
in determining whether the third party advertising expense limits are
demonstrably justified.”42 His position on deference in Harper enabled
him to overcome the evidentiary deficit that would have been fatal under
the Thomson Newspapers methodology. In addition, it allowed him to
disguise his support for an egalitarian concept of democratic
participation, which reduced expressive activity at section 2(b)‟s core to
“an equal right not to participate”.43 It is extraordinary, in that regard,
that his majority opinion referenced equality or an egalitarian conception
of participation more than 25 times. Justice Bastarache deferred to
Parliament, not because the government demonstrated that third party
spending is harmful or met the requisite standard of justification, but
because he — and others in the majority — agreed with the limit and
40

Id., at para. 98.
Id.
42
Id., at paras. 64, 87, and 88.
43
See J. Cameron, “Governance and Anarchy in the Section 2(b) Jurisprudence: A
Comment on Re Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canada” (2004) 17 N.J.C.L. 71, at 94-100.
41
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modified their concept of review under section 1 to support that
conclusion.44
Justice Bastarache‟s next, and last, decision on election law
confirmed that Harper was not isolated, and that he had changed his
mind since Thomson Newspapers. The issue in R. v. Bryan was whether
section 329 of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibited the reporting
of election results in any part of Canada where polls were still open, was
unconstitutional.45 Here, too, he wrote for a majority which upheld the
provision. Ironically, the key elements of his erstwhile Thomson
Newspapers methodology are found in Abella J.‟s dissent. In challenging
the majority opinion‟s analysis she emphasized the nature of the activity
— the transmission of election results — and its status as a “core
democratic right”;46 she articulated the requirement for “clear and
convincing evidence” to justify limits on the availability of the
information;47 and she focused on the absence of evidence to demonstrate
that “informational inequality” in access to election results harms the
electoral process in any way.48 That approach led her to the conclusion
that the legislative provision was unconstitutional and could not be
upheld.
Justice Bastarache essentially had two responses to Abella J.‟s claim
that section 329 was an unnecessary remedy for an “undemonstrated
problem” and an “overbroad intrusion on a Charter right”.49 Relying on
his own opinion in Harper, he stated that it is established principle that
“courts ought to take a natural attitude of deference toward Parliament
when dealing with election laws”.50 As Harper showed, the advantage of
deference is that it can cure most deficits of evidence and defects of
proportionality under the Oakes test. Second, Bastarache J. discounted
the expressive activity in Bryan, referring to it as “the putative right to
receive election results before the polls close” and placing it at “the
44

Chief Justice McLachlin and Major J. wrote a dissent, in which Binnie J. concurred.
R. v. Bryan, supra, note 5.
46
Id., at para. 110. Bryan was a 5-4 vote, with McLachlin C.J.C., as well as Binnie and
LeBel JJ. concurring in her opinion; Justices Deschamps, Charron and Rothstein joined Bastarache
J.‟s majority opinion, and Fish J. wrote concurring reasons which supplemented the Bastarache
opinion.
47
Id.
48
As she stated, “[a]ny evidence of harm to the public‟s perception or conduct in knowing
the election results from Atlantic Canada before they vote is speculative, conclusive and largely
unsubstantiated” and that “[t]he harm of suppressing core political speech” is profound; id., at para.
107.
49
Id., at para. 133.
50
Id., at para. 9.
45
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periphery of the s. 2(b) guarantee”.51 He also minimized the effect of the
ban in order to enhance the importance of “informational equality” as a
principle of electoral fairness in Canada. At least in Harper he admitted
that the harm of third party spending was not established by the record.
After observing that breach of informational equality is in a “class of
harms” that cannot be measured, Bryan skirted the harm requirement
altogether. Justice Bastarache‟s majority opinion failed to define what
informational equality is, or to identify what harm follows from early
access to results, other than to reference the need for public confidence
and to cite evidence from one public survey.52
Yet Bastarache J. was once again able to sway a majority to uphold
the provision, and though Thomson Newspapers took an important step
forward, Harper and Bryan took significant steps backward. As the
dissents in both later cases reveal, it would have been difficult — if not
impossible — to uphold the Harper and Bryan provisions under the
Thomson Newspapers methodology. From that perspective, it seems
clear that Bastarache J. changed his mind about the relationship between
section 2(b) and Parliament‟s authority to regulate the electoral process.
Yet more troubling than the outcomes in these cases was Bastarache J.‟s
approach to decision-making and his abandonment of principle,
specifically, the suggestion in Harper and Bryan that the Court should
defer to Parliament when it infringes constitutionally protected activity at
the heart of the democratic process, and the relaxation of review under
section 1, where expressive activities which are not harmful are limited
nonetheless.53
While Bastarache J. substituted a methodology of deference for his
rights-protective approach to section 2(b) in Thomson Newspapers, his
interventions in the section 2(d) jurisprudence went in the opposite
direction. There, he moved from majority opinions which entrenched
rights-restricting doctrine to a breakthrough which all but stood
precedent on its head.

51

Id., at para. 30.
See id., at para. 25 (discussing a poll which found that 70 per cent of Canadians surveyed
thought that voters should not know the results from other provinces before voting in their home
province).
53
For comments see C. Bredt & M. Finley, “R. v. Bryan: The Supreme Court and the
Electoral Process”, in Constitutional Cases 2007 (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 63 [hereinafter “Cases,
2007”]; and R. Haigh, “The Technology of Political Communication: R. v. Bryan and the
Knowledgeable Voter in the 21st Century”, Cases, 2007, id., at 91.
52
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III. SECTION 2(d): FROM NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE
Dunmore v. Ontario could be Michel Bastarache‟s most important
Charter decision.54 Despite stopping short of overruling the Court‟s
foundational section 2(d) precedents, he effectively achieved that result
by concluding that it was unconstitutional for the province to exclude
agricultural workers from its labour relations scheme, and imposing a
positive obligation on Ontario to ensure the meaningful exercise of their
right of associational freedom. That conclusion placed the Court‟s
decision in Dunmore openly in conflict with Delisle v. Canada, which
had reached the opposite conclusion only two years earlier, in a case
involving RCMP officers.55 Justice Bastarache authored both majority
opinions.
The drama began when he took the lead in both of the Court‟s preDunmore opinions, Canadian Egg and Delisle.56 It would not be entirely
accurate to state that Bastarache J. simply followed precedent in these
cases, because the Court had been unable to agree on a basic doctrine for
section 2(d) up to that point. In the follow-up from the Labour Trilogy,
which failed to produce a majority position on associational freedom,
Sopinka J. proposed a four-point framework in Professional Institute,
which did not secure majority support either.57 For these reasons the
section 2(d) doctrine was not settled until Bastarache J. arrived and
participated actively in Canadian Egg and Delisle. In doing so, he
cemented the status of doctrines which gave section 2(d) a narrow and
restrictive interpretation — one which had stoutly resisted the
constitutionalization of labour relations.
Though it is not generally considered a significant decision, the joint
opinion by Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ. in Canadian Egg had the
54

Supra, note 5.
Delisle, supra, note 5.
56
Canadian Egg, supra, note 5, and Delisle, id. Included in his contributions on s. 2(d)
issues, but not discussed here, is his dissenting opinion in Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, which also
supported the entitlement in the contentious context of freedom from compelled association with
labour unions, which Quebec made a statutory condition of employment in the construction industry.
For a comment which praises his dissent, see J. Cameron, “The „Second Labour Trilogy‟: A
Comment on R. v. Advance Cutting, Dunmore v. Ontario, and R.W.D.S.U. v. Pepsi-Cola” (2002) 16
S.C.L.R. (2d) 67, at 71-79 [hereinafter “Cameron, „The “Second Labour Trilogy” ‟”].
57
See Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest Territories
(Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at 402 (S.C.C.). The Labour Trilogy
comprises Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Alberta Reference”]; P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J.
No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v.
Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.).
55
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distinction of endorsing the Labour Trilogy‟s distinction between an
association and its activities and bringing the Professional Institute
framework into a majority opinion for the first time. 58 In Delisle,
Bastarache J. went further and confirmed the status of the section 2(d)
doctrine, including the Labour Trilogy and the four-point framework
from Professional Institute, which — he clarified — had been “cited
with approval” by Canadian Egg.59 Neither case provided any indication
that he, or other members of the Court in the majority, were willing to
entertain any other conception of associational freedom.60
To the contrary, Bastarache J.‟s opinion in Delisle dismissed the
claim without reservation. There, the question was whether it was
impermissible for the federal government to exclude the RCMP from its
statutory labour relations scheme. The conclusion could scarcely have
been clearer to him, and Bastarache J. resoundingly rejected the
suggestion that the legislature‟s decision to exclude the RCMP had any
consequences for their freedom of association.61 In his view, the
legislation created no obstacle or impediment to associational activity,
any failure by the RCMP to organize and bargain as an association was
not caused by or attributed to state action, and the state had no positive
obligation to facilitate the associational activities of police officers by
granting them recognition under the statute. He was unreceptive to Cory
J.‟s claim, in dissent, that the workers in Delisle were vulnerable and in
need of the Charter‟s protection.62 At this time, Bastarache J. shared the
view expressed by McIntyre J. in the Alberta Reference that “labour
relations is an area in which a deferential approach is required in order to
leave Parliament enough flexibility to act”.63
When Dunmore raised the same issue, he discovered how difficult it
was to reach a different conclusion and follow precedent at the same
58

Canadian Egg, supra, note 5, at 231-32.
Delisle, supra, note 5, at 1106-1107.
There were dissents in both cases: in Canadian Egg, McLachlin J. (as she then was) (with
Major J. concurring) dissented, and because she would have found a violation of mobility rights she
did not discuss section 2(d); in Delisle, Cory J. dissented and was joined by Iacobucci J., who had
co-written the opinion with Bastarache J. in Canadian Egg.
61
His opinion was particularly forceful on two key points. First, he emphasized that it is
settled that the government‟s failure to include certain workers in its collective bargaining scheme
creates no barrier and has no impact on the workers‟ freedom to create and organize an independent
association. Second, he maintained that s. 2‟s concern is with negative obligations and that the
guarantee does not constrain the government‟s freedom to choose which employee associations to
bargain with, or whether to bargain at all: Delisle, id., at 1015-1019.
62
Id., at 1039.
63
Id., at 1019.
59
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time. In this, section 2(d) was unlike section 2(b), where the contextual
approach allowed the Court to vary its evidentiary standard and
conception of harm with the circumstances. The wiggle room of the
Court‟s expressive freedom methodology simply did not exist under
section 2(d) doctrine, which was rigid and exclusionary. There a claim
had only succeeded once before, in Libman, where associational freedom
rode the coattails of the section 2(b) claim.64 Not only had the section
2(d) jurisprudence excluded all labour claims from the Charter, the
equality case law did not allow the Court to treat Dunmore as a case of
under-inclusiveness under section 15.65
Yet the circumstances in Dunmore were compelling, and so
Bastarache J. found a way to claim obedience to precedent while finding
in favour of the agricultural workers. Rather than admit that Delisle was
wrongly decided, he went to great lengths to explain how a different and
contrary result in Dunmore could be reconciled with existing authority.
To do so he manufactured an argument to suit the facts. He maintained
that Dunmore‟s agricultural workers were differently situated, because
the province‟s decision to exclude them from the statutory labour
relations scheme caused them — unlike their RCMP counterparts in
Delisle — to be unable to associate freely. That is why Ontario‟s failure
to include these workers in the scheme violated their right of meaningful
association and led to a positive obligation on the province to create the
statutory conditions which would promote their section 2(d) rights. Not
only did the task at hand require Bastarache J. to wholly distinguish
agricultural workers from the RCMP, it also forced him to sidestep some
of Delisle‟s unconditional statements, explain how government inaction
resulted in violations of the workers‟ freedom to associate, and then to
show how a positive obligation to promote meaningful associational
freedom could be imposed on the government.66
Dunmore has its merits and in many ways it is a brave decision.
Never mind that he had only just endorsed it in Canadian Egg and
64

Libman, supra, note 12.
See Dunmore v. Ontario, [1999] O.J. No. 4947, 37 O.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. Gen. Div.), affd
[1999] O.J. No. 1104, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 471 (Ont. C.A.), per Sharpe J. (Ont. Gen. Div.), concluding
that Ontario‟s labour relations legislation was under-inclusiveness in a way that treated agricultural
workers unequally, but that the claim could not be recognized under the Court‟s equality doctrine.
The case was so clear, under the Supreme Court‟s ss. 2(d) and 15 precedents, that the Ontario Court
of Appeal dismissed the workers‟ appeal in a single paragraph which stated, in part (at para. 1), that
“[w]e did not call on counsel for the respondents because the submissions of counsel for the
appellants … did not create any doubt in our minds about the correctness of the judgment in appeal.”
66
For a comment that calls Bastarache J.‟s reasoning to account, see J. Cameron, “The
„Second Labour Trilogy‟”, supra, note 56, at 80-88.
65
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Delisle, Bastarache J. took the monumental step in Dunmore of breaking
free from the Professional Institute67 framework and supplanting it with
a “single inquiry test” which was based on a conception of associational
freedom as a collective, rather than an individual, right.68 In this, the
majority opinion began the significant task of moving the Court away
from the Labour Trilogy, which had all but neutered section 2(d). From
an outcome-based point of view, there was much for labour advocates to
applaud.
And yet, the decision in Dunmore could not stand alongside Delisle
or other Charter precedent.69 In such circumstances, Bastarache J. had to
distort precedent70 and exaggerate the difference between categories of
workers to reach the conclusion he did. Here, it can be noted that he was
inconsistent in his approach to the role of evidence in Charter decisionmaking. As discussed above, Bastarache J.‟s majority opinions in Harper
and Bryan discounted and even ignored the evidence because it did not
satisfy the Thomson Newpspapers requirement of harm. But in Dunmore
his conclusion depended on fastidious attention to the evidence because
that was the only way he could plausibly escape the consequences of
Delisle. It is further indication of the strain Dunmore placed on
principled decision-making. Whatever the decision‟s merits may be for
agricultural workers, labour relations and the Charter, or section 2(d)
more generally, “the reasoning in Dunmore is incoherent”.71
Justice Bastarache was clearly sensitive about Dunmore‟s relationship to Canadian Egg
and Delisle and their endorsement of the earlier section 2(d) precedent; he distanced himself from
his endorsement of doctrine in those cases by stating, in Dunmore, supra, note 5, at para. 14, that the
Professional Institute framework provided “little assistance” to the Court in the Canadian Egg case,
and that the Court never ruled on the “validity of the framework” in Delisle, supra, note 5.
68
Dunmore, id., at para. 16, stating that the purpose of s. 2(d) commands a single inquiry:
“has the state precluded activity because of its associational nature, thereby discouraging the
collective pursuit of common goals”? (emphasis in original).
69
See, e.g., Dunmore (at trial), supra, note 65, at 299 (stating, in reference to Dolphin
Delivery, that the workers‟ claim “collides directly with a fundamental holding of the Supreme Court
of Canada … that the Charter has no application to private action”).
70
For an example of the analytical contortions he used to stay within precedent, see
Dunmore, supra, note 5, at para. 16 (suggesting that a key passage in Dickson C.J.C.‟s Alberta
Reference dissent is good law because the passage relied upon “was not explicitly rejected by the
majority”) and at para. 21 (stating that it can be argued that the reasoning in Delisle does not apply to
private employers because of a dictum in L‟Heureux-Dubé J.‟s concurrence which “was not rejected
by the Delisle majority”).
71
B. Langille, “The Freedom of Association Mess: How We Got Into It and How We Can
Get Out of It” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 177, at 208 (stating that the Court “attempted to stuff what was
really a section 15 claim into section 2(d)” and adding that “[t]his particular rabbit cannot come out
of this particular [section 15] hat, and everyone can see from which hat it actually did emerge [i.e.,
section 2(d)]”).
67
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Regardless of its shortcomings, Dunmore has been enormously
influential. Emboldened by the decision, the Court has since taken the
extraordinary step of overruling its pre-Dunmore section 2(d) precedent,
with the notable exception of Delisle v. Canada, which was spared.72 As
a result of B.C. Health Services, the constitutionalization of labour
relations under section 2(d) of the Charter has begun, and there can be
little doubt that the momentum for that development sprang from the
Bastarache opinion in Dunmore.73 Ironically, while opening up the scope
of associational freedom, at the same time Dunmore has had a
dampening effect on section 2(b). Even though Dunmore addressed the
exceptional circumstances which warranted the imposition of a positive
obligation under the Charter — and is limited, in principle, to that setting
— it has been applied under section 2(b) in place of Irwin Toy‟s minimal
threshold for breach to restrict the scope of expressive freedom.74 Not
only does Baier v. Alberta75 illustrate how unstable the principles of
Charter decision-making can be, it also shows, regrettably, that as long as
it can be misconceived and misapplied, precedent is not an obstacle to
outcome-based Charter interpretation. And that, despite the elaborate
analysis he provides, is the problem with Justice Bastarache‟s section
2(b) and 2(d) jurisprudence.

IV. ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE BASTARACHE
It is neither realistic to expect, nor desirable to seek, complete
consistency in judicial decision-making. Not only is what consistency
means and requires open to dispute, too much consistency suggests
72
See Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British
Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”].
See J. Cameron, “Due Process, Collective Bargaining, and s. 2(d) of the Charter: A Comment on
B.C. Health Services” (2007) 13 C.J.E.L.J. 323; R. Charney, “The Contract Clause Comes to
Canada: The British Columbia Health Services Case and the Sanctity of Collective Agreements”
(2007/2008) 23 N.J.C.L. 65.
73
B.C. Health Services, id. See Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2008] O.J. No.
4543, 92 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal granted April 2, 2009, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 9
(S.C.C.) (invalidating Ontario‟s post-Dunmore agricultural workers legislation); and Mounted Police
Assn. of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2009] O.J. No. 1352 (Ont. S.C.J.) (finding that
Parliament‟s exclusion of the RCMP from the regulatory scheme for labour relations in the federal
public service violates s. 2(d) of the Charter).
74
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
(S.C.C.). See Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.). Justice
Bastarache did not join Rothstein J.‟s majority opinion but instead signed LeBel J.‟s concurring
opinion.
75
Baier v. Alberta, id.
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inflexibility and an inability of courts or judges to entertain an organic
conception of law. Whatever it might mean, consistency was not a
priority for Justice Bastarache; to the contrary, there is an element and a
streak of not being accountable in his decision-making. An example not
discussed in this article is so compelling it should be mentioned just the
same. It is found in the Court‟s section 7 jurisprudence.
In Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), Bastarache J. vented
against Arbour J.‟s admittedly groundbreaking proposal for a substantive
interpretation of that guarantee.76 The issue there was whether section 7‟s
entitlement clause — the life, liberty and security of the person guarantee
— could ground a free-standing claim to social or economic benefits,
falling entirely outside the principles of fundamental justice and the
administration of justice criterion in the section 7 jurisprudence. Though
McLachlin C.J.C.‟s majority opinion refused to join issue with Arbour J.
on that issue, Bastarache J. did not hesitate. Instead, he wrote a fierce
response to her analysis, which reviewed the authorities and arguments at
length before declaring, unequivocally and more than once, that “at the
very least, in order for one to be deprived of a s. 7 right, some
determinative state action, analogous to a judicial or administrative
process, must be shown to exist”.77 The purpose of his intervention in
Gosselin was to refute Arbour J.‟s suggestion that section 7 does have a
role to play in monitoring and enforcing social and economic benefits.
Given the force of his dissent in Gosselin it is amazing that
Bastarache J. provided McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. with a key vote in
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General).78 The question there was
whether legislation which prohibited access to private health insurance,
for publicly funded services, violated section 7 of the Charter. Justice
Bastarache joined the joint opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J.,
which found the provision arbitrary and unconstitutional, rather than that
of Binnie and LeBel JJ. On its face that opinion was more consistent with
the Bastarache dissent in Gosselin, because it cited the administration of
76

[2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 216. Justice Bastarache might have been provoked to respond in Gosselin by
Arbour J.‟s inventive use of Dunmore v. Ontario, supra, note 5, to support her proposal for a
substantive interpretation of s. 7 and the imposition of positive obligations on the state to provide
certain social and economic entitlements.
78
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.). The votes among the seven members
of the panel in Chaoulli were critical because the Court divided 3-3-1; with Deschamps J. basing her
decision in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, a majority
invalidated the provision. The judges who addressed the issue divided evenly under s. 7 of the
Charter.
77

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

339

justice criterion and opposed the use of section 7 to monitor policy
decisions which were unconnected with the justice system. Even though
Arbour and Bastarache JJ. dissented in Gosselin and the obligation to
follow precedent was not an issue in Chaoulli, consistency surely was. In
the absence of explanation, in the form of concurring reasons, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that Justice Bastarache simply changed
his mind, and did not feel that he was accountable in Chaoulli for the
position he had so unambiguously taken in Gosselin.
Michel Bastarache‟s style of decision-making at the Supreme Court
was certain and authoritative. He was not hesitant to state his
conclusions, and nor did he equivocate — or doubt — the correctness of
his decisions, even when he appeared to be changing his mind. It was a
style that served him well, because he persuaded a majority to sign his
opinions in the six fundamental freedoms decisions that have been
discussed in this article. At the same time, his authoritative manner left
him little room to shift or retreat from the consequences of his own
precedent. When forced with a choice between what principle suggested
or even required, and his own perception of what justice demanded in the
context of particular circumstances, he favoured the outcome at the
expense of principle and precedent. In doing so he seemed unwilling or
unable to accept that the circumstances required him to choose between
the two.
Principled decision-making does not permit judges to disregard
precedent, distort the analysis, or change their minds without explanation,
and nor does it lead — against all hope — to the outcome a judge
favours. That is the burden and the responsibility of principled decisionmaking, and in large part what makes it so challenging. Michel
Bastarache‟s attachment to principle, and to the rigours of principled
decision-making are evident, and honourable. But, as the jurisprudence
shows, he was wilful too, and determined, through force of will and
implausible lines of analysis, to win a majority for the outcomes he
preferred. Justice Bastarache was right about judicial accountability and
yet not fully able, in his fundamental freedoms jurisprudence, to meet its
standard.

